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Abstract
Formal and informal commercial sex work is a way of life for many poor women in
developing countries. Though sex workers have long been identied as crucial in a¤ecting
the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the nature of sex-for-money
transactions remains poorly understood. Using a unique panel dataset constructed from
192 self-reported sex worker diaries which include detailed information on sexual behavior,
labor supply, and income shocks, we nd that sex workers adjust their supply of risky, better
compensated sex to cope with unexpected income shocks, exposing themselves to increased
risk of HIV infection. In particular, women are 3.2% more likely to see a client, 21.7% more
likely to have anal sex, and 20.6% more likely to have unprotected sex on days in which
a household member falls ill. Women also increase their supply of risky sex on days after
missing work due to STI symptoms. Given that HIV prevalance has been estimated at
9.8% in this part of Kenya, these behavioral responses entail signicant health risks for sex
workers and their partners, and suggests that sex workers are unable to cope with income
risk through other formal or informal consumption smoothing mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Exchanging sex for money, goods, or services is a way of life for many poor women in developing
countries, yet little is understood about the way that the commercial or transactional sex market
functions. While commercial sex workers (CSWs) have long been identied as critical in a¤ecting
the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS, 2002; Hawken et al., 2002; Hudson, 1996;
Plummer et al., 1991), comparatively little work has gone beyond characterizing sex workers as
a high-risk subpopulation.
Even estimating the number of women engaged in transactional sex is notoriously di¢ cult.
This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where transactional sex is present within many
types of sexual relationships, including long-term partnerships and even marriage (Swidler and
Watkins, 2007; Caldwell et al., 1989; Luke, 2006; Schoepf, 2004; Hunter, 2002; Wojcicki, 2002a).
In Kenya, 14.5% of men and 5.5% of women aged 15-49 report having ever engaged in transac-
tional sex, a gure which is likely an underestimate given the sensitive nature of the question
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004). In this context, commercial sex work might be thought
of as one extreme along a continuum of sexual relationships that feature a transactional com-
ponent, with either "dating" or monogamous marriage at the other extreme. In this study, we
identied 1,205 formal and informal sex workers in Busia, Kenya, a peri-urban town in Western
Kenya. This amounts to roughly 11.6% of the population of Busia women aged 15-49.
This paper utilizes a unique panel dataset constructed from 192 daily sex worker diaries to
analyze how sex workers decide whether to engage in unprotected sex with clients. The diaries
included questions on income, expenditures, transfers given and received, and, most importantly,
the specic sexual services provided to each client, the amounts paid for these services, and
whether they used a condom for each sex act. In total, the dataset includes information on
18,894 transactions over 12,432 sex worker days.
We study sex workersdecisions in an intertemporal framework, and estimate how the supply
of unprotected sex is a¤ected by health shocks. We nd compelling evidence that women increase
their supply of risky, better compensated sex in response to short-term income shocks at home.
Women are 3.2% more likely to see a client, 21.7% more likely to have anal sex, and 20.6%
more likely to engage in unprotected sex on days in which another household member (typically
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a child) falls ill. Similar responses are observed on days just after a woman recovers from the
symptoms of an STI (which arguably might be seen as an exogenous shock to her ability to
supply sex). Women do this in order to capture the roughly 38 Kenyan shilling (US $0.54)
premium for unprotected sex and the 74 shilling (US $1.06) premium to anal sex.
Our results are related to a number of other studies of risk-coping mechanisms in poor
countries, especially since the women we study make up a sizeable fraction of the population of
adult women in the area. Like most people in developing countries, the women in our sample lack
access to formal credit or savings, and the informal risk coping mechanisms that are typically
available to sex workers (such as informal insurance systems of gifts and loans between friends
and family) have consistently been shown by other authors to be ine¢ cient in insuring risk (i.e.,
Townsend, 1994; Paxson, 1992; Gertler and Gruber, 2002). The increase in transactional sex
we nd is similar to the labor supply e¤ect documented by, for instance, Kochar (1995, 1999),
though the increase in labor supply we nd here is of independent interest because it comes
at such a high cost: HIV prevalence has been estimated at 9.8% in Busia District (Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2004). Over time, the increases in risky sex that we observe here have
enormous health consequences for these women, their sexual partners, and society as a whole as
HIV is passed on to the general population. These results are all the more striking because we
focus on daily income shocks, rather than larger shocks such as annual or seasonal agricultural
uctuations.
This paper is one of the few studies to identify and document specic costs to ine¢ cient
consumption smoothing, beyond consumption uctuations themselves. Other examples include
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), who argue that Indian farmers are forced to use productive assets
(bullocks) to smooth consumption, incurring substantial reductions in long-term productivity in
the process, and Jacoby and Skouas (1997), who nd that Indian households pull their children
out of school to work on the farm when shocks occur, which may reduce the long-term earnings
potential of their children. Our study also highlights the di¤erence between income smoothing
and consumption smoothing, as discussed in Morduch (1995). Empirically, consumption by the
women in our sample is insensitive to health shocks, so that standard tests would conclude
that women are well-insured against these shocks. Such tests do not explicitly account for how
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consumption smoothing is achieved, which in this case involves a signicant health cost.1
The results of this study also have important implications for understanding the spread of
HIV/AIDS, and in designing interventions to limit its spread. In sub-Saharan Africa, the risk of
HIV/AIDS infection is enormous for both formal and informal sex workers. Among formal sex
workers, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has been estimated to be as high as 25 to 75 percent
(National AIDS Control Council [Kenya], 2005; UNAIDS, 2004; Morison et al., 2001). The risks
are similarly large for women that supply transactional sex more casually. Dunkle et al. (2004)
estimated that informal sex workers in South Africa were 54% more likely to be HIV positive
than other women. Research on concurrent partners in sub-Saharan Africa also suggests that
these women may have a similar or even greater impact on HIV transmission than "formal"
sex workers (Epstein, 2007; Morris and Kretzschmar, 1997; Hudson, 1996). This paper sheds
light as to why these women do not choose to use condoms, and nds evidence that unexpected
health shocks form part of the explanation.
To our knowledge, the relationship between shocks and the labor supply of sex workers
has not been formally studied within economics.2 However, some qualitative sociological and
anthropological research has suggested that women have sex with multiple partners or develop
sexual networks for nancial support and income security (Swidler and Watkins, 2007; Schoepf,
2004; Hunter, 2002; Wojcicki, 2002b). Researchers have also examined the types and amounts of
gifts received from partners in informal or transactional sex relationships (Luke, 2006; Dunkle et
al., 2004; Luke, 2003), but not the e¤ect of income shocks or income risk on those transfers. In
economics, our paper is somewhat related to Edlund and Korn (2002) in that we both study sex
workers, but our paper adds health risk as an additional dimension and focuses on choices within
transactional sex over time, rather than on the choice to enter the commercial sex market.
Perhaps the most relevant economics papers are Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) and Rao,
Gupta, Lokshin, and Jana (2003), both of which nd signicant compensating di¤erentials for
unprotected sex (compared to protected sex) among CSWs. However, our focus here is not on
1Chetty and Looney (2006) also discuss these issues.
2One somewhat related paper is Ahlburg and Jensen (1998), which suggests that rural families mitigate
interpersonal income risk by sending a family member into urban commercial sex work. Their argument focuses
primarily on migration and secondarily on interpersonal risk, whereas we deal with intertemporal risk.
3
the premium itself but whether the existence of a premium allows women to increase the amount
of unprotected sex that they supply as a strategy to deal with health shocks. In this respect,
this paper also contributes to recent work examining whether sexual behavior might be rational
given certain economic conditions (Oster, 2007).3
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple model of sex work in an intertemporal labor supply frame-
work. The model is in the spirit of MaCurdy (1981) and Kochar (1995, 1999). The sex worker
is assumed to live for T periods and to maximize lifetime expected utility over consumption ct
and health risk ht as follows:
maxE[
T tX
s=t
s tu(cs; h0; :::; hs 1; hs) j 
t] (1)
where  is the discount rate, and 
t is information available at time t. We assume that
@u(cs;h0;:::;ht 1;ht)
@ht
< 0, to reect disutility from work, as well as the cost of pregnancy or the
disutility from certain risky sex acts such as anal sex, experiencing the symptoms of an STI, or
the health and socioeconomic consequences of HIV infection. Utility also depends on the history
of past health risks taken. In particular, we assume that @u(cs;h0;:::;ht 1;ht)@hk  0 for all k < t:
quality of life is lower for women that are at greater risk of being HIV positive.4
The womans intertemporal budget constraint is
At+1 = (1 + rt)(P (ht) +At 1   ct) (2)
where At represent assets, rt is the interest rate, and P (ht) is the total price paid by all clients
on date t. The price is assumed to be increasing in ht (as it is empirically); otherwise, women
3The paper is also related to Dupas (2007), who evaluates an intervention to reduce risky sex along the intensive
(whom to have sex with) rather than extensive (whether to have sex or not) margin. Similarly, our paper is focused
on risky choices within transactional sex, rather than on the decision whether to engage in transactional sex or
not.
4We do not impose any functional form on the utility function, but one example that ts into this framework
would be one in which a womans utility is una¤ected until she develops AIDS, is declining thereafter, and is 0
after she dies.
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would never have unprotected sex. We follow the literature and assume that this comes from
the fact that clients derive utility from unprotected sex and are willing to pay more to forego
condom usage.5
Assuming an interior solution, the rst order conditions at time t are that
T tP
s=t
s t
@u(cs; h0; :::; hs)
@ht
+ tP
0(ht) = 0 (3)
@u(ct; h0; :::; ht)
@ct
  t = 0 (4)
t = (1 + r)E[t+1 j 
t] (5)
where t represents the marginal value of wealth at time t.
The last equation makes explicit that the marginal value of wealth at time t depends on
expectations of future wealth. If a woman receives a permanent negative shock to her income
such that E[t+1 j 
t] increases, then t increases and ct decreases. In addition, the amount
of health risk that the woman chooses to take increases, from (3). Equation (3) also implies
that women that believe themselves to already be at signicant risk of being HIV positive will
increase their supply of risky sex by more than women that believe their risk is smaller (since
the marginal cost of accepting greater risk is smaller for these women).
In this paper, however, we are interested in the e¤ect of transitory shocks that are small rel-
ative to lifetime income. Since these shocks are small, they should have no e¤ect on E[t+1 j 
t]
or t, and so should have no e¤ect on the amount of health risk that is accepted. Instead, these
shocks should be smoothed through the use of savings (i.e., Paxson, 1992). However, if savings
and credit are unavailable so that the 1-period budget constraint binds, then it is possible that
a woman may adjust her accepted health risk in response to even small, short-term income
shocks.6
5See Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2006) for a model of sex work that derives this condition explicitly.
6Few women in our sample have formal savings accounts (see Table 1) or access to bank credit, but most save
money informally at their home and have access to gifts and loans from friends and family.
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The implication of this simple model - that labor supply may adjust to short-term income
shocks in the absence of perfect consumption smoothing - is not new, but the importance of our
study is that the increase in labor supply comes at great individual cost in terms of increased risk
of contracting HIV or other STIs. The increased health risk will also likely impose an external
cost on society as a whole, as HIV is transmitted between sex workers and clients and then on to
other partners. In addition, quite apart from any e¢ ciency calculation, the tests in this paper
are of signicant importance in terms of designing interventions to limit the spread of HIV by
sex workers.
3 Research Design
3.1 Background on Busia, Kenya
Our study takes place in Busia District, a rural area in Western Province, Kenya with a semi-
urban center, Busia Town. The estimated HIV prevalence in Busia District is 9.8%, compared to
the national average of 6.7% (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004). Busia Town has a population
of 44,196 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001) and is located on the Ugandan border, along one
of two major trucking routes from the port city of Mombasa (on the Indian Ocean) to Kampala,
via Nairobi.
Truck stops are often where sex workers congregate, and Busia was identied as a hot spot
for commercial sex activity due to the high volume of trucks overnighting. A GIS-based study
conducted by the Strengthening STD/HIV Control Project in Kenya (SHCP) found that Busia
received approximately one-quarter of the trucks overnighting at the Kenya-Uganda border
(National Aids Control Council, 2005).7 Unlike sex workers in many developed countries and
in urban areas of developing countries, however, many of the sex workers in Busia do not self-
identify as commercial sex workers (CSWs). Many of the women are orphans, all are widowed,
divorced, or separated, and most identify themselves as "survivors": women who engage in sex
work in order to survive. The women in our sample range from formal commercial sex workers
7The other major border town is Malaba, which receives about three times as many overnight trucks as does
Busia.
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to women who engage in informal transactional sex.
3.2 Identifying Commercial Sex Workers
To obtain a representative sample of women engaged in sex work in Busia Town, we identied
women through a peer group network which was originally established by the Strengthening
STD/HIV Control Project in Kenya (SHCP), a Kenyan organization associated with the Uni-
versity of Manitoba and the University of Nairobi that worked with thousands of formal and
informal sex workers across Kenya. SHCP began working in Western Kenya in 1999 by organiz-
ing women into peer groups of 15 to 30 women each. Each group is led by a peer educator, and
the peer groups within each district are supervised by a trained nurse who serves as a eld co-
ordinator. Though SHCP was phased over to the government in October 2005, the peer groups
within a district continue to operate essentially as community-based organizations.
Working with the University of Nairobi Institute for Tropical and Infectious Diseases (UNI-
TID), this study began in October 2005. By that time, SHCP had recruited approximately 400
women into 30 peer groups in Busia Town. The eld coordinator for the district was employed
as an enumerator for this project and was assisted by one of the peer educators. To identify a
sample of formal and informal sex workers, we used the same denition as SHCP: any single,
widowed, divorced, or separated woman, aged 18 or older, who had multiple concurrent sex
partners. We asked each peer group member to provide a list of all the women living in Busia
Town she knew who t this description. For the purposes of this paper, we do not focus on the
distinction between formal and informal sex workers.
We identied 1,205 sex workers in Busia Town from this "snowball" technique.8 Assuming
8Working with a sample identied by women in SHCP-organized peer groups has advantages and disadvan-
tages. One advantage is that women in the peer groups know other single women in their community with multiple
concurrent sexual partners, which should increase the size and improve the representativeness of the identied
sample. Furthermore, the structure of the peer groups allows peer educators and peers to better locate the sex
workers whom they identify. Finally, SHCP has had a long, stable relationship with sex workers in Western
Province, so that sex workers trust the organization, which tended to limit non-participation and attrition among
sampled sex workers. The major disadvantage is that the women identied in this way may not be fully represen-
tative of the sample of sex workers in Busia Town. As in any snowball sampling technique, the sample includes
fewer women right at the margin of participation in transactional sex.
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that the age distribution of females in Busia is similar to that reported in the 2003 Kenyan
Demographic and Health Survey for the rest of rural Kenya, we estimate that 11.6% of Busia
women aged 15-49 earn some income from sex work. From this, we argue that the women
involved in this project are not particularly atypical of the average woman in Busia Town, and
that the results of this study are generalizable to a signicant proportion of the female population
in Kenya.
3.3 Data Collection
Of the 1,205 women that were identied, a random sample of 248 women were selected for
project participation, stratied by peer group. The data collection took place in two rounds:
Round 1 occurred between October and December, 2005, and Round 2 occurred between July
and October, 2006. We asked each woman to keep a daily diary for the duration of each round in
which she self-reported her income, expenditures, the transfers she had given and received, and
the shocks she had encountered that day. We focus on three types of shocks in this study: own
illness or injury, illness or injury of another household member, and the incidence of a sexually
transmitted infection. Illness is an indicator variable that is coded as 1 if the individual reported
having a cough, fever, diarrhea, cuts, or burns, or had reported su¤ering from malaria, typhoid
or any other illness.
In the diaries, women were also asked to record detailed information on each encounter with
a client, including the activities performed, whether a condom was used, and the price that was
paid (both in cash and in goods or services). After a preliminary analysis of the Round 1 data,
some additional questions were added to the Round 2 diaries. The additions which are relevant
to this paper included questions on client characteristics and somewhat more detailed questions
on the transfers received from regular clients. In each round, each respondent kept the diary for
a period of 3 months, though the rst few weeks were often not usable in the nal analysis due
to reporting errors made as women were learning the diaries.
The diaries were extensively pre-tested by the authors, a research assistant, and the two
enumerators to maintain respondent condentiality, meet norms of cultural sensitivity, and
to ensure that respondents understood all of the questions. To ensure data quality, the two
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enumerators conducted diary checks roughly once a week, during which they checked for errors
and resolved mistakes with respondents.
In order for women to keep these self-reports, it was of course necessary that they could read
and write Kiswahili, one of the o¢ cial languages in Kenya and the language used in the diaries.
Literacy levels in the sample were relatively high: 95% of the sample could read Kiswahili, and
88% could write Kiswahili (Table 1). To avoid losing illiterate women, a special e¤ort was made
to keep them in the sample. Each illiterate woman was assigned a peer educator who met with
her daily to read the diary questions and ll in the answers for her.
In addition to the diaries, a background questionnaire in the style of the World Bank Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Surveys was also administered by the enumerators. This survey
included questions on family background, household characteristics, education, migration, land
and durable good ownership, access to credit and savings, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, attitudes
towards sex work, and other related questions. To compensate respondents for keeping the
diaries, we paid women in Round 1 1,000 Kenyan shillings (US $14), and women in Round 2
1,500 Kenyan shillings (US $21) for their participation.9 Of the 248 women that were sampled,
we obtained complete, usable data from 192 of them (77%). The other women could not be
included because they refused to participate or stopped lling out the diaries during the sample
period, because they moved to another area and could not be traced, or because they kept the
diaries poorly or did not ll them completely. In total, the nal dataset consists of 192 women,
18,894 transactions, and 12,199 sex worker days.10
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
3.4.1 Background Statistics
Background statistics for our sample of sex workers are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows
that the average sex worker is 28 years old, has completed over 9 education grades, and has
9Round 2 participants were compensated slightly more because the diaries were more detailed and took more
time to complete.
10The breakdown of the nal sample by round is 84 women in Round 1 and 91 in Round 2, with 17 women
in both rounds, so that pooled regressions are in most cases reported for 192 women. The actual number of
observations in each regression di¤ers depending on available data.
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roughly 2 children and 3 dependents.11 Eighty-four percent of these women are heads of their
households. Twenty-three percent of the sex workers in the sample are widowed, 20% are
divorced or separated, 13% are currently cohabitating, and 44% were never married and are not
currently cohabitating. In total, about 43% of the women are previously widowed, divorced,
or separated, which is much higher than the proportion of 10.2% found among the general
population of Kenyan women aged 15-49 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004). The high number
of previously married women is consistent with sociological and anthropological studies of sex
workers in rural areas, and it is likely that many are HIV widows (Swidler and Watkins, 2007;
Wojcicki, 2002a).
Panel A also presents statistics on the e¤ect that sex work has had on sex workersperceptions
of the likelihood that they will eventually marry (or remarry). Only 3% of women report that
working in the commercial sex industry has made the prospect of future marriage less likely, but
41% report that working in sex work has made marriage more likely. This is notable because
one explanation for the signicant wage premium to sex work is that it serves as a compensating
di¤erential for reduced marriage market possibilities (Edlund and Korn, 2002). These results,
however, seem to suggest that this explanation is unlikely to be important for this population
of sex workers and is consistent with Arunachalam and Shah (2008).12
HIV knowledge characteristics are shown in Panel B of Table 1. Sixty percent of the sample
has been tested for HIV, which is much higher than the national average (14.7%) or the average
for Western Province (14.6%) among women aged 15-49 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
The women scored very highly (with an average score of 94 out of 100) on a test of HIV knowledge
that covered HIV transmission pathways, the relationship between HIV and AIDS, risk reduction
methods, and misconceptions surrounding HIV/AIDS. Taken together, Panel B suggests that
most sex workers in Busia are quite aware of the health risks related to HIV/AIDS.
Finally, Panel C presents summary statistics on access to formal credit and savings. Though
11The education level of women in our sample is similar to that of the average Kenyan woman. Fifty-seven
percent of our sample have completed primary school, compared to 56% across Kenya and 67% across Western
Province (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
12 It is also possible that supplying commercial sex a¤ects marriage prospects on the intensive (partner quality)
rather than extensive (nding a partner) margin.
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37% of sex workers report having a savings account, almost all of these savings accounts are
group arrangements (mostly arranged through SHCP) that do not easily allow for withdrawals.
Indeed, among women with accounts, average savings withdrawals in the month prior to the
survey were just 73 Kenyan shillings (Ksh), equivalent to about US $1.04. Instead of relying
on formal mechanisms, women tend to save through Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
(ROSCAs): sixty-four percent of women participate in ROSCAs, and the average sex worker
that participated in a ROSCA saved over 7,000 Kenyan shillings (US $100) in her ROSCA in
the past year (not shown). However, nearly all of these ROSCAs have a predetermined payout
schedule and so are not ideal for consumption smoothing purposes, as discussed in Gugerty
(2007).
3.4.2 Shocks, Transfers, and Expenditures
In this study, we focus on three types of health shocks that are commonly experienced by sex
workers. The rst is an indicator that is coded as 1 if the sex worker reported having a fever,
cough, diarrhea, typhoid, malaria, cuts, burns, or other injuries or illnesses. The second is
whether the sex worker reported that another member of the household su¤ered from any of
these illnesses. The third is the occurrence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), which
should presumably a¤ect a womans ability to supply sex.13
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics for these 3 shocks. Column 1 presents the
daily averages. Women reported household sickness on 37% of days, own sickness on 34% of
days, and STIs on 3% of days. Column 2 reports the percentage of women that reported these
shocks at least once over the 3 month data collection period. Each percentage is high, ranging
from 34% for STIs to 98% for own sickness.
Panel B presents statistics on access to informal nance, including transfers given to and
received from friends and family members, and gifts received from regular clients. On an average
day, women send about 32 Ksh (US $0.46) in gifts and loans to friends and family, and receive
about 55 Ksh (US $0.79) back. Women receive another 90 Ksh (US $1.29) per day in gifts from
13We also collected information on other shocks, including the death of a friend or family member, but do not
include them in the analysis as they have ambiguous e¤ects on labor supply. For instance, women may need to
work more to a¤ord funeral contributions but may work less to attend the funeral itself.
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regular clients. Though we do not have a detailed breakdown on the types of gifts given in
Round 1, the Round 2 data indicates that most of these gifts came in the form of cash or in-kind
payments, though regulars also occasionally pay for rent or other expenses. Overall, women
appear to be relatively well connected to these informal credit markets, though the amounts
that are typically transferred on an average day are small.
Panel C presents statistics on daily expenditures. Average total expenditures are about 655
Ksh (US $9.36) per day and average food expenditures are 148 Ksh (US $2.11) per day. Though
national estimates of average per capita expenditures are hard to come by in Kenya, these gures
are certain to be signicantly higher than the Kenyan average.
3.4.3 Labor Supply and Sexual Behavior
Table 3 presents summary data on labor supply and sexual behavior for the sex workers in the
sample. Panel A shows that the average women makes about 680 Kenyan shillings (US $9.71)
per day in sex work, compared to about 100 shillings (US $1.43) from other sources (such as
agriculture, small business, or salaried work at bars or restaurants). The average woman engages
in sex work on a bit more than 3 out of every 4 days and sees an average of 1.52 clients per day.14
As in other studies of sex work, average income in the sample is very high relative to the average
in the area: income from sex work is approximately 7 times that of other daily income earners
in Busia District (Robinson, 2007). This di¤erence is signicantly higher than the 56% income
premium in Mexico found by Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) and the 37% wage premium
found by Rao et al. (2003) in Calcutta, and more in line with the much larger premium found
by Booranapim and Mainwaring (2002) in Thailand.
The next few rows in Table 3 report mean sexual behavior in the sample. For each variable,
Column 1 presents the overall daily average, and Columns 2-4 includes transaction level data.
Column 1 indicates that, over all the days covered (including those in which they did not work),
women have vaginal sex on 74% of days, anal sex on 22% of days, and oral sex on 19% of days.
Women have unprotected sex on 18% of days, and have an average of 0.42 unprotected sex acts
14While we do have data on hours worked, we do not report the hours here as it is di¢ cult to determine if they
truly represent work. For example, a woman may spend all night with one client, but part of the time may be
spent sleeping.
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per day. From Column 2, women have vaginal sex with 95% of clients, anal sex with 23% of
clients, oral sex with 19% of clients, and unprotected anal or vaginal sex with 16% of clients.
One important distinction between clients is those that are considered regulars and those
that are considered casuals. Though this distinction is not completely clear, regular clients
have had repeated encounters with a given woman and may be considered a boyfriend, lover,
or partner. In focus group discussions, the women often cited emotional support and love as
characteristics associated with a regular client. In contrast, casual clients are often not known to
the sex worker before the transaction. Since casual clients can become regular clients over time,
and many women have multiple regular clients, the denition of a regular and casual client can
be hard to dene. However, since SHCP had already been using the regular and casual client
terminology, we allowed the respondents to determine on their own if a particular client should
be classied as a regular or casual. Columns 3 and 4 provide transaction level data on services
provided to regular and casual clients. The major di¤erences between regular and casual clients
are in anal sex and in unprotected sex. Sex workers are slightly more likely to have anal sex
with casuals (21% of the time, compared to 17% of the time with regulars), but are more likely
to have unprotected sex with regulars (21% of the time, compared to 14% with casuals). This
may be because women are more aware of the risk prole of regular clients than they are of
casual clients.
Finally, Panel C presents the percentage of women that engaged in various sexual activities
at least once during the sample period. Interestingly, 82% of women engaged in anal sex and
70% engaged in unprotected vaginal or anal sex. The anal sex gures are particularly interesting,
because they are much higher than those presented in other sources.15 For instance, Brody and
Potterat (2003) review a wide variety of public health and anthropological studies and nd a
maximum anal sex prevalence gure of 42.8% in self-reported recall data. The authors argue,
however, that most anal sex gures are likely underestimates, as respondents are much more
likely to admit to having anal sex in a diary or in a computer questionnaire, neither of which
are commonly used in Africa. Among a very similar group of sex workers in Kenya, Ferguson
and Morris (2003) nd that only 20% of CSWs in the Kenyan Highlands responded that they
15We thank Damien de Walque for pointing this out to us.
13
had ever had anal sex.16
As mentioned previously, roughly 44% of the women in this sample participated in peer
groups sponsored by the Strengthening STD / HIV Control Project in Kenya and received
education about HIV and other STIs, as well as increased access to condoms. This is one
reason why women may have scored so highly on the test of HIV knowledge presented in Table
2. Compared to the marginal sex worker, these women should be more aware of the risks of
unprotected sex, so the gures in Table 3 are likely to be lower bounds on the frequency of
unprotected sex among sex workers in rural Africa.
4 Risk Premium
4.1 Estimation
We will estimate a risk premium by performing a xed e¤ects regression of the price paid by
the client on the activities performed, and whether a condom was used. Ideally, this regression
should control for client characteristics. However, we only have panel information on clients for
a small portion of our data, so we will have to assume homogeneity on the demand side for most
of what follows. This leaves us with an estimating equation of the type
Pit =
HX
h=1
hXhit +
AX
a=1
aXait + i + vt + "it (6)
for sex worker i at date t. This is an equation relating the price Pit to the performance of
risky sexual activities Xhit and other activities Xait. Assuming homogeneity in demand on a
particular date, the individual xed e¤ect i will pick up di¤erences across women in bargaining
power and in the willingness to accept risk, while other time-varying e¤ects such as changes in
demand on particular days will be captured with date controls vt (vt includes controls for the
day of the week and the month of the year). "it is a random disturbance term that may capture
unmeasured factors such as a womans or clients mood at a particular time. If this regression is
properly specied, h will reect the risk premium to the risky activity Xhit (mainly unprotected
16To explore the implications of anal sex for HIV transmission, we should ideally have measures of unprotected
anal sex. We only have this information for part of our sample, however.
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sex).17 Xait will consist of all other activities that do not fundamentally involve an increase in
risk of contracting HIV, such as providing company or performing a massage.
4.2 Results
The results from estimating Equation (6) are presented in Table 4. Regressions in Columns
1-3 are conducted on the entire sample, while regressions in Columns 4-6 are restricted to the
Round 2 sample in order to include client characteristics as explanatory variables. In addition
to the variables shown, all regressions also include a control for the round of data collection.
The variable used to estimate the compensating di¤erential for unprotected sex is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the woman had at least 1 unprotected sex act (with anal and vaginal sex
aggregated together).18
The results suggest a sizeable risk premium to unprotected sex and to the provision of other
services. The premium to anal sex is approximately 74 Kenyan shillings (US $1.06), which can
be explained partially through the increased health risk.19 Also of note is the 69 shilling (US
$0.99) return to company, which likely reects unobserved characteristics of clients that request
company. Column 1 also shows that unprotected anal or vaginal sex is associated with a 38
shilling (US $0.54) increase in the price. As the total average price paid is 485 shillings, this
amounts to a premium of about 7.8%, which is rather low when compared with the risk premium
of 23% calculated by Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005). However, the market for sex work in
Mexico, where sex work is legal and regulated and where average incomes are higher, is likely
to di¤er greatly from the Kenya context. The lower risk premium may also be the result of
17Protected anal sex may be considered risky as well because of the increased likelihood of tearing a condom
during anal intercourse.
18We obtained similar estimates using the number of unprotected sex acts as a regressor, and by disaggregating
unprotected sex into unprotected anal and unprotected vaginal sex. These latter estimates are much less precise
because those measures were only available in the round 2 data.
19Studies on HIV transmission through male-to-female anal sex are very rare, and causality is di¢ cult to
establish, but sex workers in South Africa that supply anal sex (either protected or unprotected) have been found
to have a 10-120% increase in the risk of HIV infection (Karim and Ramjee, 1998). Similarly large increases have
been estimated for couples in Europe (European Study Group on Heterosexual Transmission of HIV, 1992). We
are not aware of studies that estimate the per-act transmission probability for heterosexual anal sex in Africa.
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di¤erences in data - Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi (2005) collect recall data on the last three to
four client transactions rather than a longer panel. In addition, only 11.7% of their sample has
variation in condom usage with clients, while 70% of our sample has variation in condom usage.
Columns 2 and 3 run the same specication among the regular and casual client samples
separately. The di¤erences between regular and casual clients in the prices paid for various
activities are not signicantly di¤erent (tests not shown), but regular clients actually pay more
for unprotected sex than do casual clients (the di¤erence is not signicant). These results suggest
that women are compensated for risk even by regular clients, and that women have at least some
discretion over the activities they perform.
Columns 4-6 restrict attention to the Round 2 data, so that we may estimate the e¤ect of
client characteristics (as reported by the sex worker) on prices. These characteristics include
whether the client is circumcised, the clients wealth level, attractiveness, and occupation, and
whether the sex worker thinks the client is at high risk of having HIV/AIDS. We also include
controls for tribe and cleanliness, though we do not include these coe¢ cients in the Table.
Unfortunately, many of the client characteristics are missing because women often failed to keep
track of this information. As these non-responses are almost certainly non-random, we need
to be cautious in interpreting the results (though the inclusion of xed e¤ects should eliminate
some bias across women).
That said, the results in Columns 5 and 6 make intuitive sense. Prices are higher (though the
coe¢ cient is insignicant) for wealthier clients and lower (signicant at 5% or 10%, depending
on the specication) for more attractive clients. The price does not seem to be signicantly
higher for clients whom the sex worker raters to be at high risk of having HIV/AIDS.
In sum, the results of Table 4 are consistent with the notion that sex workers have some
discretion in choosing whether to use a condom, that a risk premium exists to unprotected sex,
and that it may be rational for women to choose to engage in unprotected sex to capture the
risk premium. In the next section, we test whether women choose to do this.
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5 Consumption Smoothing and the Supply of Unprotected Sex
5.1 Estimation
The simple model in Section 2 predicts that consumption and risky sexual behavior will respond
to permanent income shocks but not to transitory shocks that do not a¤ect the lifetime budget
constraint. To examine these relationships empirically, we will estimate xed e¤ects equations
of the type
hit = Sit + i + vt + "it (7)
eit = Sit + ei + evt + e"it (8)
where hit is a measure of unprotected sex, eit represents household expenditures (we did not
collect consumption data), and the xed e¤ects i and ei are meant to proxy for individual-
specic variables, notably preferences and the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. vt and evt
include controls for the day of the week and the month of the year. Sit is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the household encountered a health shock, and "it and f"it are iid error terms.
An equation like (8) is often used to test for consumption smoothing. If the estimated  can-
not be di¤erentiated from 0, consumption smoothing is often considered e¢ cient and individuals
are thought of as being relatively well insured from intertemporal income risk. However, such an
estimation does not provide any information on how individuals choose to cope with risk. For
instance,  may be close to 0 if individuals engage in costly income smoothing (Morduch, 1995),
if individuals are risk averse and choose to maintain consumption in the face of income shocks
by incurring costs such as reducing human capital or health investments in household members
(Jacoby and Skouas, 1997; Chetty and Looney, 2006), or if households use productive assets
such as bullocks to smooth consumption (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). As we will discuss
below, our own estimated  is very low, but women incur signicant (expected) health costs by
increasing their supply of risky sex in response to income shocks.
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5.2 Results
5.2.1 Expenditures
Before examining the labor supply responses to health shocks, we perform xed e¤ects regressions
of daily levels of various expenditure categories on the 3 types of shocks previously discussed:
whether a woman is sick herself, whether a member of her household is sick, and whether a
woman is su¤ering from an STI. We also include an indicator for the rst day after having
experienced an STI. Since experiencing an STI often precludes supplying sex, women can only
adjust their behavior after the STI has passed. All dependent variables are aggregated at the
day level, so there is only one observation per woman. Results are presented in Table 5.
For all of the shocks, total and private expenditures20 seem to be insensitive to the occurrence
of income shocks. For instance, private expenditures actually increase by about 11 shillings (US
$0.16) when another household member gets ill, and food expenditures are insensitive to all of
these shocks. Taken at face value, these results suggest that sex workers are well insured against
unexpected income shocks, though this result says nothing about how consumption smoothing
is achieved. As the next few Tables will show, sex workers maintain consumption in large part
by increasing their supply of unprotected sex and accepting signicant health costs.
5.2.2 Participation in the Sex Sector and the Supply of Unprotected Sex
Table 6 presents xed e¤ects estimates of the impact of the various shock measures on labor
supply. Starting with Panel A, own sickness has the expected e¤ect for all labor supply measures:
women are less likely to participate in the commercial sex market when they are sick. The more
interesting result is the e¤ect of household sickness on labor supply. Women are 2.7 percentage
points more likely to see a client when a household member falls ill. This amounts to a 3.2%
increase in the probability of participating in the sex sector. As can be seen in Columns 3 and
4, women increase their participation by taking on more casual clients. This is notable because
women usually do not know casual clients before the transaction, so they probably can be less
sure of the probability that a casual client is HIV positive than they could be of a regular client.
20Private expenditures include alcohol, soda, cigarettes, meals in restaurants, clothing, health and beauty
products, and other privately consumed categories such as airtime for cellular phones.
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Columns 5-7 show that women adjust their labor supply in the commercial sex sector rather
than in other sectors in which they work.
Panel B presents results for experiencing the symptoms of a sexually transmitted infection
(STI). As expected, experiencing an STI reduces the probability of supplying transactional sex,
and represents a sizeable income shock: total income decreases by 177 Ksh on such days (US
$2.53). If women are unable to use risk coping mechanisms to cope with such a big income
shock, they may choose to work more after recovering from the STI, and Panel B suggests that
they do just this. Though not all of the responses are statistically signicant at traditional levels
due to the rarity of STI shocks (occurring on 3% of days), all of the coe¢ cients in the regressions
related to sex work are positive. Women see 0.265 more clients and earn an additional 233 Ksh
(US $3.33) from sex work on days after recovering from an STI.
These responses are very similar to Kochar (1995, 1999), who shows that individuals work
more when their households incur negative income shocks. In this paper, we are ultimately
interested in how the supply of unprotected sex responds to health shocks, since an increase in
unprotected sex entails a signicant (expected) health cost on women, especially for women that
are HIV negative. If unprotected sex is indeed very sensitive to short-term health shocks, then
alternative consumption smoothing mechanisms must be quite ine¢ cient, and the provision of
more e¤ective smoothing mechanisms could have substantial benets in reducing the spread of
HIV.
Table 7 presents xed e¤ects regressions of unprotected sex measures on health shocks. The
dependent variables are indicators for whether a woman had unprotected sex, the number of
unprotected sex acts in which she engaged, and indicators for having anal, vaginal, or oral sex.
All dependent variables are measured at the daily level. Panel A shows that women dramatically
increase their supply of protected and unprotected sex in response to these short-term income
shocks. When a household member falls sick, women are 3.2 percentage points more likely to
have unprotected sex, 4.3 percentage points more likely to have anal sex, 2.3 percentage points
more likely to have vaginal sex, and 3.7 percentage points more likely to have oral sex. In
percentage terms, these are increases of 20.6%, 21.7%, 2.8%, and 21.3%, respectively. Women
also have 0.068 more sex acts on such days, though the coe¢ cient in this regression is not quite
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signicant at 10%. As will be discussed in more detail in Section 6, these increases substantially
increase the likelihood of being infected with HIV.
Panel B, which focuses on STIs, shows a similar pattern with even larger coe¢ cients, though
the coe¢ cients do not reach statistical signicance due to the rarity of STIs. In a larger sample,
we expect it would be possible to nd statistically signicant e¤ects.
Taken together, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the supply of sex (including unprotected sex)
is very sensitive to even small, short-term income shocks. Furthermore, the results imply that
intertemporal income risk might have a substantial impact on the likelihood that women who
supply transactional sex become infected with HIV.
5.3 Robustness Checks
The results of the previous section suggest that sex workers accept a signicant amount of health
risk to deal with short-term illness shocks, which implies that other consumption smoothing
techniques have failed. In this section, we provide several robustness checks to test more closely
whether our results appear consistent with a consumption smoothing explanation for the labor
supply response. Ideally we would be able to check whether responses are smaller for women that
have access to formal consumption smoothing mechanisms such as individual savings accounts
in a bank, but the vast majority of women in this sample are unbanked and only have access to
group savings accounts that heavily restrict their withdrawals (see Table 1). For this reason, we
are unable to compare women with varying levels of access to smoothing mechanisms. Instead,
we examine how the results vary by income level and by perceived HIV status.
5.3.1 Results by Income Level
If women supply more risky sex as a consumption smoothing mechanism, it should be the poorest
women that are most likely to use unprotected sex as a risk-coping technique, particularly since
the average sex worker in Western Kenya makes signicantly more than other daily income
earners (i.e., Robinson, 2007). There remains signicant heterogeneity in sex worker earnings,
however: over the sample period, a woman at the 25th percentile of the sex worker income
distribution earned 509 Ksh (US $7.27) per day, while a woman at the 75th percentile earned
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1,089 Ksh (US $15.56) per day.
To explore whether it is poorer women that are most sensitive to the shocks, we construct
indicators for whether the sex workers daily income is below the daily income of the median
sex worker (US $10.94), and interact this indicator with the household health shocks. Table 8
presents xed e¤ects regressions of sexual behavior on health shocks and the interactions. Since
we are primarily interested in the sickness indicators, we present only those results in this Table.
The results are generally consistent with a consumption smoothing explanation as the interac-
tions are generally positive, though several coe¢ cients are not statistically signicant. However,
the interaction is signicant for whether the sex worker participated in the transactional sex
market, the number of clients (and casual clients) she saw, and whether she had vaginal sex.
The coe¢ cient for the regression for unprotected sex is not signicant, though it is positive and
large in magnitude.
In general, Table 8 suggests that poorer women are more sensitive to short term health
shocks than are richer women. It is interesting to note, however, that certain responses appear
to be statistically signicant and substantial in magnitude even for richer women. For instance,
we estimate that women in the top half of the sex worker income distribution increase the
probability that they have anal sex by 3.1 percentage points on days in which a household
member falls ill. This may suggest that responses are driven in part by behavioral biases such
as reference-dependent preferences, at least for women at the top end of the sex worker income
distribution.
5.3.2 HIV Status and Labor Supply Responses
We have shown that women increase their supply of unprotected sex when a household member
falls ill, and have argued that accepting that health risk imposes a cost on women. However, sex
workers are already at considerable risk of contracting HIV and so may already be HIV positive
(or believe that they are likely to be HIV positive). If so, the additional health risk incurred
may be relatively minimal (though the risk of STI infection is likely non-trivial).21
21 In addition, unprotected sex can have negative health consequences for HIV positive women because it can
lead to re-infection and to an increased viral load, which tends to speed up the development of AIDS.
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Though we cannot know if HIV positive women respond di¤erently to shocks than do HIV
negative women, since we did not test women for HIV, we did ask women if they had ever been
voluntarily tested for HIV and what they thought their risk of being infected was. We classify
as likely HIV positive any woman that had been tested for HIV and that responded that the
probability that she was infected with HIV was over 50%. We classify 7.0% of women as likely
HIV positive in this way, a gure which is likely a major underestimate given that the HIV
prevalence was 9.8% in this part of Kenya and sex workers are presumably more likely to be
infected than the average Kenyan.
We rst test whether the risk premium to unprotected sex di¤ers between women that are
classied as likely positive and other women.22 The results are presented in Appendix Table 1.
The risk premium for women that are likely positive is just 18 Ksh and statistically insignicant
(due in large part to the small sample size), while the premium for other women is 44 Ksh (which
is statistically signicant). The di¤erence in the estimated premia is statistically signicant,
suggesting that women that believe they are positive charge a lower premium than do other
women.23 This result lends additional support to the notion that the risk premium is rational.
The most important question for our analysis is whether it is only women that already believe
that they are HIV positive that switch to unprotected sex when shocks occur. This question
is crucial in understanding whether our results imply signicant welfare loss for women due
to inadequate consumption smoothing, and in understanding how the observed labor supply
responses might a¤ect the spread of HIV. Appendix Table 2 explores this issue by interacting
the occurrence of health shocks with the indicator for whether the woman is likely to be HIV
positive.
In general, it does appear that those women that are likely to be HIV positive are more
likely to increase their supply of unprotected sex in response to health shocks, though women
that are not likely to be positive also signicantly increase the level of risk they accept. The
22We also examined whether women with higher scores on the HIV knowledge test we administered charged a
di¤erent premium, but the interaction was insignicant.
23We also examined whether all women that reported having a greater than 50% chance of being HIV positive
charged a lower premium than women that reported having a lower than 50% chance, but the di¤erence in premia
was not statistically signicant.
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interacted term is positive in all regressions except for the regression on sex work income as a
dependent variable,24 though it is only statistically signicant for the regressions on the indicator
for participation in the transactional sex market and on having anal sex. However, women that
are not classied as likely to be HIV positive still increase their probability of having unprotected
sex and anal sex by 2.8 percentage points and 3.2 percentage points, respectively (compared to
3.2 and 4.3 percentage points, respectively, in the earlier specication, in Table 7).25 In summary,
responses seem to be higher for women that are likely to already be positive, though still high for
women that are not. We conclude from this that HIV negative women incur signicant health
costs by increasing their probability of having unprotected sex in response to shocks.
6 How Big is the Expected Health Cost?
The increase in unprotected sex that we observe among sex workers in Western Kenya imposes
at least some health cost on women. But how big are these costs in real terms? In this section,
we estimate the increase in the probability of becoming infected with HIV due to inadequate
consumption smoothing mechanisms. We conservatively do not include any costs associated
with increases in the probability of becoming infected with an STI, and we do not take into
account the increased risk of becoming infected with HIV while su¤ering from an STI (see Oster
(2005) for more on this issue). We also do not include costs associated with reinfection. For these
reasons, the estimates in this section should be thought of as lower bounds on the probability
of HIV infection.
With that in mind, the probability of an HIV negative woman becoming infected after a
sexual encounter with a client is pclient  punprotected  t, where pclient is the probability that the
client is HIV positive, punprotected is the probability that the sex worker has unprotected sex
with the client, and t is the probability that an HIV positive client transmits the virus to the
sex worker if they have unprotected sex. Clients of sex workers are at much greater risk of HIV
24This is due in part to the fact that women that are likely to be HIV positive charge a lower premium for
unprotected sex.
25We also examined how labor supply responses di¤ered for women reporting a greater than 50% chance of
being infected (whether or not they had been tested), and found no di¤erence between their behavior and that of
women that reported a lower than 50% chance of infection.
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infection than other men: Côté et al (2004) and Lowndes et al. (2000) estimate that clients of
sex workers have an HIV prevalence roughly 4-5 times that of the general population in Accra,
Ghana, and Cotonou, Benin, respectively. We conservatively assume that the clients of sex
workers have a 25% chance of infection (roughly 2.5 times that of the general population). We
use 1/1000 as the transmission probability (Gray et al., 2001; Magruder, 2008).
From Table 7, the average sex worker has unprotected sex 0.342 times per day when her
household does not experience a health shock, and 0.410 times per day when her household
does.26 From Table 2, household health shocks occur on 37% of days. Thus, a woman that was
perfectly insured from these health shocks would have unprotected sex roughly 3650:342  125
times per year, whereas the average woman in our sample would have sex 365  (0:342  0:63 +
0:410:37)  134 times per year. Assuming this woman is initially HIV negative, she is infected
with probability 1=1000  0:25 = 0:00025 after each unprotected sex act. We assume that the
probability of infection from protected sex is 0.
An initially HIV negative woman who is perfectly insured will be infected with probability
1  (1  tpclient)125y after y years, while the average woman in our sample will be infected with
probability 1  (1  tpclient)134y. Table 9 summarizes the probability of infection after di¤erent
time periods. As might be expected, the probability of infection is high even if women were
perfectly able to smooth their consumption, since all of these women have a large number of
unprotected sex acts. However, for women that use unprotected sex to cope with income risk,
the probability of HIV infection is 0.2 percentage points higher after 1 year, 0.4 percentage
points higher after 2 years, 1 point higher after 5 years, and 1.6 percentage points higher after
10 years. In percentage terms, these increases are on the order of 5-7% after all time periods.
Since the price premium to unprotected sex is just 44 Ksh (US $0.63), this means that women
accept, for instance, a 7.1% increase in the risk of HIV infection after 1 year for about US $5.67.
Given average incomes of the women in the sample, the extra income earned does not seem
adequate to compensate women for the risk that they are taking.
26Though the coe¢ cient in this regression (in Table 7) is not quite signicant at 10%, we use the total number
of sex acts rather than the probability of having unprotected sex since women typically have multiple partners in
a day.
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7 Discussion
Using panel data from a sample of 192 formal and informal sex workers in Busia, Kenya, this
paper is the rst to quantitatively investigate the relationship between sex work and income
risk. We conducted our study in rural Western Kenya, an area in which transactional sex is
prevalent: we estimate that 11.6% of the adult female population aged 15-49 supplies at least
some transactional sex. For this reason, our results are generalizable to a larger population of
women than is true of studies of sex work in more developed countries, and our ndings t into
the larger literature on risk-coping and consumption smoothing in poor countries.
Like many people in poor countries, the sex workers in our sample are subject to considerable
income risk but lack e¤ective formal or informal means of coping with that risk. To make up
for income shortfalls, these women choose to increase their supply of better compensated but
more dangerous and more unpleasant sex in order to capture the price premiums associated
with these activities. In particular, we nd that women are 3.2% more likely to see a client,
20.6% more likely to engage in unprotected sex, and 21.7% more likely to have anal sex on days
in which a household member experiences a health shock. Women also appear to increase their
supply of risky sex immediately after recovering from a sexually transmitted infection (STI),
the symptoms of which likely make it di¢ cult or impossible to engage in sex work until it is
treated. Given the high HIV prevalence rate in this part of Kenya (9.8%) and the large health
risks associated with unprotected sex, these increases in risky sexual behavior have enormous
health consequences.
These results, therefore, suggest that in addition to helping women exit sex work, there
are opportunities to reduce the health risks within sex work beyond HIV education and condom
distribution. Focusing specically on household illness, sex workers may be better able to reduce
their risky sexual behavior if their children and dependents had better access to health services
or subsidized health inputs. Public health interventions aimed at children are likely to have
positive externalities on the spread of HIV, and perhaps future evaluations of childhood disease
interventions can monitor these e¤ects.
The results of this paper suggest that the existing informal consumption smoothing mecha-
nisms that are available to sex workers are ine¢ cient and that women incur substantial health
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costs by choosing to increase their supply of risky sex as an alternative risk coping strategy. For
this reason, the provision of formal consumption smoothing or risk coping mechanisms could
substantially improve sex worker welfare, and could also potentially limit the spread of HIV.
Much remains unknown about the transactional sex market in developing countries, and this
study has only been able to scratch the surface by focusing on intertemporal risk and the supply
of unprotected sex. Future work might focus attention on the extensive decision to enter the
commercial sex market in the rst place, rather than on the intensive margin as we do in this
paper. More research is crucial, however, in order to understand how best to design interventions
to limit the spread of HIV, a disease which remains the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan
Africa (UNAIDS, 2007).
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Table 1. Background Characteristics
Panel A. Background Information
Age 28.43
(6.98)
Educational Attainment 9.20
(2.69)
Literacy Read Kiswahili Write Kiswahili
0.95 0.88
Respondent is Head Of Household 0.84
Number of Biological Children 2.06
(1.83)
Total # of Dependents 2.96
(2.36)
Age Began Seeing Clients 18.67
(5.14)
Number of Regular Clients (at time of 2.24
  background survey) (1.07)
Marital Status
Widowed 0.23
Divorced / Separated 0.20
Cohabitating 0.13
Never Married / Not Cohabitating 0.44
Has working as a CSW changed likelihood of marrying?
Yes, made it more likely 0.41
Yes, made it less likely 0.03
No change 0.57
Tribe
Luhya 0.39
Luo 0.51
Other 0.11
Respondent is in a peer group 0.44
Respondent has outside job 0.84
Panel B. HIV Knowledge
Tested for HIV 0.60
HIV Knowledge Test Score (0-1 scale) 0.94
(0.06)
Panel C. Access to Savings
Has Savings Account 0.37
Savings Withdrawn in Past Month 72.82
    (for women with savings accounts) (430.27)
Participates in ROSCA 0.64
Observations 192
Notes: In Panel A, the Cohabitating category for marital status includes women that have
never been married.  Monetary values in Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was roughly 70
Kenyan shillings / $1 US during study period. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Summary Statistics from Diaries:  Shocks, Transfers, Expenditures, and Savings
(1) (2)
Occurred at Least
Daily Average Once over 3 Month
Panel A. Shocks Sample Period
Someone in Household Sick (other than respondent) 0.37 0.93
Respondent Sick 0.34 0.98
Respondent had STI 0.03 0.34
Observations 12386 209
IDs 192 192
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B. Transfers & Gifts from Clients (Daily Averages) Sending Out Receiving From Net Flow
Loan and Gift Flows from Family & Friends 32.32 54.90 -22.49
(143.83) (206.58) (245.95)
Gifts received from Regular Clients 90.39
(286.47)
Observations 12372
Panel C. Expenditures (Daily Averages) (1)
Total Expenditures 655.00
(681.41)
Food Expenditures 148.44
(153.01)
Observations 12427
IDs 192
Note: Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household or respondent reported having a cough, fever, 
malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts or burns, or any other illness. There are more observations than IDs in 
Column 2 of Panel A because some women were sampled in both rounds. 
All monetary values in Kenyan shillings (Ksh). The exchange rate over the data 
collection period was approximately 70 Ksh / $1 US. Means are reported, with standard deviations in
parentheses. Exact number of observations differ for some variables, due to reporting errors.
Table 3. Summary Statistics from Diaries:  Labor Supply and Sexual Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Daily Average Transaction Data: Transaction Data: Transaction Data:
Panel A. Averages All Clients Regulars Only Casuals Only
Participated in the Sex Sector 0.76
Income from Sex Work 682.45
(746.26)
Total Income (All Sources) 784.19
(775.97)
Number of Clients Seen 1.52
(1.12)
Number of Regular Clients Seen 0.54
(0.66)
Had Vaginal Sex 0.74 0.95 0.96 0.94
Had Anal Sex 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.26
Had Oral Sex 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21
Had Unprotected Vaginal or Anal Sex 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.14
# Times Unprotected Vaginal or Anal Sex 0.42 0.27 0.40 0.20
Panel B. Occurred at Least Once During Sample Period
Vaginal Sex 1.00
Anal Sex 0.82
Oral Sex 0.71
Unprotected Vaginal or Anal Sex 0.70
Observations  12432 18894 6697 12022
Note:  Figures are calculated from self-reported daily diary data. In Panels A and B, the figures in Column 1
are daily averages.  Figures in Columns 2-4 are averages across all transactions (up to a maximum of 3 client
transactions per woman per day).  The number of observations in Columns 3 and 4 do not sum to the total in 
Column 2 due to reporting errors. There are 192 total women in the sample, 108 of whom participated in Round 2.
Table 4. Hedonic Price Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Clients Regular Clients Casual Clients All Clients All Clients All Clients
Vaginal Sex 18.511 37.420 12.676 64.287 42.033 29.754
(25.438) (37.016) (25.254) (45.019) (45.464) (56.269)
Anal Sex 73.868 60.718 65.116 167.886 84.519 81.095
(21.091)*** (25.571)** (21.908)*** (50.758)*** (42.732)* (39.060)**
Oral Sex 22.357 43.655 8.097 75.083 71.009 97.559
(14.604) (24.543)* (13.931) (24.615)*** (34.515)** (41.039)**
Massage 59.563 63.119 46.667 53.521 18.729 18.177
(13.940)*** (19.504)*** (14.368)*** (24.821)** (28.026) (26.224)
Kissing 49.169 51.250 39.573 50.141 32.634 41.127
(11.684)*** (20.771)** (9.702)*** (25.947)* (29.186) (26.676)
Manual Stimulation 43.359 67.799 27.776 87.313 61.714 55.671
(15.283)*** (26.643)** (14.616)* (25.405)*** (32.346)* (40.989)
Company 69.130 46.823 58.745 81.660 44.485 29.287
(13.011)*** (17.751)*** (13.296)*** (23.883)*** (28.732) (22.778)
Stripping 39.476 30.917 34.479 48.728 25.385 39.515
(11.078)*** (15.215)** (11.650)*** (18.987)** (23.903) (25.054)
Sex in Thighs 35.699 18.974 51.699 67.973 113.480 72.131
(14.954)** (21.922) (18.173)*** (35.477)* (51.423)** (60.153)
Other Activities 52.696 83.112 38.713 24.521 49.440 23.888
(27.867)* (45.234)* (24.828) (38.497) (51.141) (37.718)
Regular Client -18.770 -30.481 -13.916 7.889
(14.702) (25.816) (25.999) (32.661)
Had Unprotected Sex 37.918 78.224 21.385 39.203 26.081 17.674
(16.322)** (20.174)*** (19.866) (31.281) (26.325) (34.546)
Client is Circumcised -27.989 -21.315
(20.838) (23.967)
Client is Very Wealthy 38.45 41.415
(45.999) (52.721)
Client is Handsome -82.616 -110.21
(45.220)* (54.424)**
Sex Worker Believes Client is at 4.552
  High Risk of HIV / AIDS (29.286)
Client Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 18676 6674 12002 7108 3869 2419
Number of women 192 192 192 108 108 95
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and day of the week. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include controls for the round of data collection. The dependent variable is Kenyan shillings.
The exchange rate was approximately 70 Kenyan shillings to $1 US during the data collection period.
Regressions include controls for other responses to the questions "Is the client wealthy?" and "Is the client handsome," but
the coefficients are omitted for space.
is handsome. Columns 5 and 6 also include controls for client tribe, occupation and cleanliness.
Averages prices paid by type of client: regular - 485 shillings; casual - 432 shillings; overall - 450 shillings.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
---------- Round 2 Sample Only ----------
Table 5. Effect of Shocks on Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Food # of Meals Private Medical Non-Medical
Expend. Expend. Respondent Expend. Expend. Shared Expend.
Mean of Dependent Variable^ 571.94 142.97 2.80 65.50 13.33 340.84
Panel A. Household Sickness
Somebody in Household (other 75.327 7.662 -0.015 11.206 18.372 51.022
  than respondent) Sick (17.783)*** (6.381) (0.013) (3.471)*** (3.363)*** (13.059)***
[0.132] [0.054] [-0.005] [0.171] [1.379] [0.150]
Respondent Sick 56.429 -0.039 -0.016 2.667 26.349 25.939
(18.060)*** (7.734) (0.016) (3.761) (3.163)*** (13.211)*
[0.099] [-0.000] [-0.006] [0.041] [1.977] [0.076]
Observations 12194 5485 12015 12175 12158 12155
Number of women 192 108 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
Panel B. Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI)
STI 2.660 12.263 0.003 -8.693 25.933 -8.993
(39.764) (26.242) (0.043) (7.449) (8.759)*** (27.426)
[0.005] [0.086] [0.001] [-0.133] [1.946] [-0.026]
First Day After STI 150.029 32.830 0.059 42.477 27.399 72.358
(80.120)* (32.957) (0.068) (19.426)** (11.284)** (59.901)
[0.262] [0.230] [0.021] [0.648] [2.056] [0.212]
Observations 10245 4446 10094 10227 10213 10210
Number of women 192 108 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and for the day of the week. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include controls for the round of data collection. 
^Means of dependent variables are means when all shocks are equal to 0.
Private expenditures include alcohol, soda, cigarettes, meals in restaurants, clothing, health and beauty 
products, and other privately consumed categories such as airtime for cellular phones.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Labor Supply Response to Health Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Saw Any # of Clients # of Regular # of Casual Sex Work Other Total
Clients Clients Clients Income Income Income
Mean of Dependent Variable^ 0.837 1.622 0.600 1.009 711.849 89.351 801.200
Panel A. Household Sickness
Somebody in Household 0.027 0.077 0.002 0.073 55.051 5.176 60.226
  (other than respondent) Sick (0.013)** (0.035)** (0.019) (0.029)** (20.026)*** (5.910) (20.252)***
[0.032] [0.047] [0.003] [0.072] [0.077] [0.058] [0.075]
Respondent Sick -0.081 -0.165 -0.044 -0.119 -100.114 -2.655 -102.768
(0.018)*** (0.044)*** (0.023)* (0.031)*** (22.595)*** (4.913) (22.701)***
[-0.097] [-0.102] [-0.073] [-0.118] [-0.141] [-0.030] [-0.128]
Observations 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
Panel B. Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI)
STI -0.222 -0.410 -0.068 -0.351 -146.817 -30.593 -177.410
(0.049)*** (0.115)*** (0.063) (0.081)*** (61.893)** (8.991)*** (65.309)***
[-0.265] [-0.253] [-0.113] [-0.348] [-0.206] [-0.342] [-0.221]
First Day After STI 0.057 0.265 0.110 0.151 232.913 -26.432 206.482
(0.042) (0.091)*** (0.056)* (0.088)* (86.859)*** (13.457)* (87.513)**
[0.068] [0.163] [0.183] [0.150] [0.327] [-0.296] [0.258]
Observations 10247 10247 10247 10247 10247 10247 10247
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and for the day of the week. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection.
Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other illnesses.
^Means of dependent variables are means when all shocks are equal to 0.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Health Shocks and the Supply of Unprotected Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Had Unprotected # Unprotected Had Anal Had Vaginal Had Oral
Sex Sex Acts Sex Sex Sex
Mean of Dependent Variable^ 0.156 0.342 0.198 0.825 0.174
Panel A. Household Sickness
Somebody in Household 0.032 0.068 0.043 0.023 0.037
  (other than respondent) Sick (0.012)** (0.041) (0.012)*** (0.013)* (0.013)***
[0.206] [0.199] [0.217] [0.028] [0.213]
Respondent Sick -0.003 -0.016 -0.016 -0.084 -0.010
(0.011) (0.030) (0.013) (0.018)*** (0.012)
[-0.019] [-0.047] [-0.081] [-0.102] [-0.058]
Observations 12199 11981 12199 12199 12199
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Panel B. Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI)
STI 0.018 -0.037 -0.063 -0.229 -0.013
(0.035) (0.094) (0.036)* (0.047)*** (0.030)
[0.116] [-0.108] [-0.318] [-0.277] [-0.075]
First Day After STI 0.085 0.170 -0.023 0.071 0.055
(0.063) (0.137) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044)
[0.546] [0.497] [-0.116] [0.086] [0.316]
Observations 10247 10099 10247 10247 10247
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and for the day of the week. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection.
Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other illnesses.
Unprotected sex includes unprotected anal and unprotected vaginal sex.
^Means of dependent variables are means when all shocks are equal to 0.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8. Health Shocks, Income, and Transactional Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Saw Any # of Clients # of Regular # of Casual Sex Work
Panel A. Participation in Sex Sector Clients Clients Clients Income
Somebody in Household (other than respondent ) Sick -0.003 -0.021 -0.014 -0.010 38.319
(0.017) (0.048) (0.027) (0.041) (34.004)
Somebody in Household Sick * Mean Daily Income 0.062 0.202 0.033 0.171 34.528
   below Median of all CSWs (0.025)** (0.069)*** (0.039) (0.062)*** (41.211)
Respondent Sick -0.082 -0.165 -0.044 -0.120 -100.276
(0.018)*** (0.043)*** (0.023)* (0.030)*** (22.668)***
Observations 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Had Unprotected # Unprotected Had Vaginal Had Anal Had Oral
Panel B. Sexual Activities Sex Sex Sex Sex Sex
Somebody in Household (other than respondent ) Sick 0.019 0.043 -0.008 0.031 0.027
(0.015) (0.057) (0.018) (0.017)* (0.016)*
Somebody in Household Sick * Mean Daily Income 0.026 0.051 0.064 0.024 0.022
   below Median of all CSWs (0.026) (0.084) (0.026)** (0.025) (0.023)
Respondent Sick -0.003 -0.016 -0.085 -0.016 -0.010
(0.011) (0.030) (0.018)*** (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 12199 11981 12199 12199 12199
Number of women 192 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and for the day of the week. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection.
Panels include controls for own sickness though the coefficients are not reported. 
Percentile of income distribution: minimum - 153 Ksh; 25th - 509 Ksh; 50th - 766 Ksh; 75th - 1,089 Ksh; maximum - 2,068 Ksh.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9. Expected Difference in the Probability of HIV Infection Over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perfect Consumption Average Woman Difference Percentage 
Smoothing in Sample Difference
Estimated Probability of HIV Infection after:
    1 year 0.031 0.033 0.002 0.071
    2 years 0.061 0.065 0.004 0.070
    3 years 0.090 0.096 0.006 0.068
    4 years 0.118 0.125 0.008 0.067
    5 years 0.145 0.154 0.010 0.066
    10 years 0.268 0.285 0.016 0.061
    20 years 0.465 0.488 0.024 0.051
Note: Calculation assumes that the average client has 0.25 probability of being 
infected with HIV and that the transmission probability per sex act is 0.001.
The estimated number of unprotected sex acts is taken from Table 7.
We compute that a woman that is perfectly insured from health risk would have
125 unprotected sexual encounters per year, while the average woman in our 
sample would have 134 unprotected sexual encounters per year.
Appendix Table 1. Risk Premium by Perceived HIV Status
Likely Positive Others
(1) (2)
Vaginal Sex 46.759 2.054
(47.935) (14.912)
Anal Sex 45.311 59.023
(30.648) (8.938)***
Oral Sex 76.991 15.805
(31.141)** (8.633)*
Massage 125.813 52.511
(28.102)*** (7.659)***
Kissing 10.251 46.857
(27.748) (6.777)***
Manual Stimulation 72.123 38.869
(39.251)* (9.498)***
Company 67.429 64.501
(22.934)*** (6.553)***
Stripping 99.99 34.35
(23.948)*** (7.152)***
Sex in Thighs 7.68 34.01
(51.195) (10.757)***
Other Activities 18.356 55.477
(83.901) (18.040)***
Regular Client -15.685 -24.904
(20.868) (6.214)***
Had Unprotected Sex 18.493 44.35
(37.339) (8.875)***
Observations 1329 16968
Number of women 13 174
R-squared 0.11 0.04
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and 
the day of the week. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include
controls for the round of data collection. The dependent variable is Kenyan shillings. 
The variable for likely being HIV positive equals 1 if the woman had previously taken an HIV test and 
reported that she believed herself to have a greater than 50% chance of being HIV positive.
Seven percent of women are coded as being likely to be HIV positive.
Client characteristics not included due to a lack of observations.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 2. Health Shocks, Perceived HIV Status, and Transactional Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Saw Any # of Clients # of Regular # of Casual Sex Work
Panel A. Participation in Sex Sector Clients Clients Clients Income
Somebody in Household (other than respondent ) Sick 0.017 0.058 -0.007 0.063 61.142
(0.014) (0.038) (0.021) (0.032)** (21.468)***
Somebody in Household Sick * Likely HIV Positive 0.080 0.183 0.090 0.087 -69.076
(0.041)* (0.114) (0.073) (0.113) (79.672)
Respondent Sick -0.075 -0.148 -0.035 -0.111 -93.533
(0.017)*** (0.041)*** (0.022) (0.030)*** (22.214)***
Observations 11931 11931 11931 11931 11931
Number of id 187 187 187 187 187
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Had Unprotected # Unprotected Had Vaginal Had Anal Had Oral
Panel B. Sexual Activities Sex Sex Sex Sex Sex
Somebody in Household (other than respondent ) Sick 0.028 0.056 0.014 0.032 0.035
(0.014)** (0.045) (0.014) (0.013)** (0.013)***
Somebody in Household Sick * Likely HIV Positive 0.046 0.147 0.071 0.122 0.032
(0.046) (0.128) (0.045) (0.067)* (0.033)
Respondent Sick 0.000 -0.016 -0.078 -0.012 -0.007
(0.011) (0.030) (0.018)*** (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 11931 11730 11931 11931 11931
Number of id 187 187 187 187 187
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and the day of the week.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for the round of data collection.
Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other
illnesses. The variable for likely being HIV positive equals 1 if the woman had previously taken an HIV test and 
reported that she believed herself to have a greater than 50% chance of being HIV positive.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
